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SPEECH 



OF 



HON. T. L. CLINGMAN, OF N. C, 



IN FAVOR OF 



HIS PROPOSITION FOR A MEDIATION IN THE EASTERN WAR. 



DELIVERED 



IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 3, 1855. 



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7 U.S.A. 

Washington : 

DA? Ttfv CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE OFFICE. 
1855. 



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MEDIATION IN THE EASTERN WAR. 



The House being in the Committee of the 
Whole on the state of the Union — 

Mr. CLINGMAN said: 

Mr. Chairman: I will ask the attention of the 
committee, not to the subject upon which my 
friend from South Carolina [Mr. Keitt] has bo 
eloquently addressed the committee, for I should 
not like to attempt to glean in a field which he has 
reaped so carefully, but to another question which 
has some intrinsic merits, and which I hope to be 
able to present in the interval that will elapse prior 
to the usual time of adjournment. 

It will be recollected that, at an early day of this 
session, 1 offered a proposition, suggesting the 
propriety of this Government offering its media- 
tion to the belligerent Powers of Europe. The 
following is the proposition, as modified by me: 
A Joint Resolution requesting the President to tender the 

mediation of the United States to the Powers engaged in 

the Eastern war. 

Whereas, the people of the United States see, with re- 
gret, that several of the great Powers of Europe are engaged 
in a war which threatens to be of long duration, and disas- 
trous in its consequences to the industrial and social inter- 
ests of a large portion of the civilized world ; and being, 
under the favor of Providence, in the full enjoyment of the 
blessings of peace, distant from the theater of conflict, dis- 
connected with the causes of quarrel between the parties 
belligerent, and, as a nation, having no immediate interest 
in the contest, and no purpose to interfere, forcibly or in 
an unwelcome manner, nevertheless are of opinion that 
the controversy may be susceptible of pacific adjustment, 
through the interposition of a neutral and friendly Power : 
Therefore — 

Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representa- 
tives of the United States of America in Congress assem- 
bled, That we would view with satisfaction a tender to the 
belligerents of the mediation of the United States, provided 
it should be in accordance with the President's views of 
the public interests. 

My object at that time was simply to get the 
subject before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
of which I am known to be a member, leaving it 
to the discretion of that committee to act upon it as 
to them might seem best. Since then, there has 
been a great deal of comment upon that subject by 
the press generally. The proposition has been 
assailed in some quarters, and defended with abil- 



ity in others. The course of remark has been 
such, that I desire to make a short explanation of 
my views in relation to this subject, and of the 
reasons which governed me in making the move- 
ment. 

I do not propose to speak as a member of the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs now, because I 
have not the right, under the rules of the House, 
to refer to anything which occurs in the commit- 
tee until it shall think proper to make a report to 
the House. I desire only to meet some of the 
objections which doubtless induced gentlemen to 
vote against the proposition at the time when it 
was first moved. 

It is said, in the first place, by objectors, to be 
an intervention on our part with the affairs of 
foreign Governments. If it be intervention, it is 
precisely such intervention as this Government has 
practiced from its foundation. Every Minister 
sent abroad is sent to influence the action of some 
foreign Government, and to induce it so to regu- 
late its action as to benefit, and not injure us. In 
point of fact, we have ourselves had several 
instances of mediation submitted to us, which we 
have accepted, thereby admitting that it was not 
such intervention as gentlemen would now exclude 
us from offering to foreign Governments. Our 
Ministers are instructed to interfere with the action 
of foreign Governments, so far as it may affeet 
us, and no further; and hence they are not ex-, 
pected to look to the internal action of any Gov- 
ernment, but merely to its external relations, 
because in these latter we ourselves have an 
interest. For example, if the Emperor of Russia 
should deprive us of the trade of the ports of the 
Black Sea, or Baltic, our Minister, Mr. Seymour, 
would be instructed to remonstrate against it. If 
that interruption should arise from a conflict be- 
tween Russia and some other Power, why then 
we might appeal to both of the belligerent parties. 
In this particular instance, our trade is interrupted 
in those seas by the existing war, and our Gov- 
ernment has a right to relieve us from such an 
injury, if it is practicable for it to do so. 

A gentleman over the way said, the other day, 



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when I first brought up this proposition, that he 
hoped that the war between Russia and the allied 
Powers would continue for fifty years. I take it 
for granted that he did not express this benevo- 
lent wish [a laugh] from any opinion that it was 
advantageous to the parties engaged in it; but he 
must have made the remark to carry the impres- 
sion that the United States would derive some 
advantage from it. It will be conceded, on all 
hands, that it will give us no glory and no addi- 
tional territory. If we are to be benefited, there- 
fore, it must be in a pecuniary point of view, 
either by increasing our exports, that is to say, 
exhancing the value of what we have to sell, or 
diminishing the price of what we have to import 
or purchase. 

Let us examine this matter briefly, at the outset 
of the argument, first with reference to what we 
have to sell. 

Our principal article of export is cotton; and now, 
in the face of two short crops, it is down to less 
than eight cents. My own opinion is, and I say 
it with deference to the opinions of other gentle- 
men, that but for the war, cotton would probably 
be now worth eleven or twelve cents, as it was in 
1850 and 1851. I say so, because the recent 
supplies do not, I think, bear a greater ratio to 
the present demand of the world than did the 
crops in the years referred to. If so, the loss on 
this article alone, will make a difference of at 
least forty millions of dollars in the value of our 
exports; and, in point of fact, I have no doubt 
that the war makes a difference of twenty-five to 
forty millions in this respect alone, besides losses 
in tobacco and other articles. Gentlemen will say 
to me, perhaps, that breadstuff's are increasing in 
value, but they forget that the drought of last year 
bo destroyed the crops in most of the grain- 
growing States, that we shall have nothing to 
spare for the next twelvemonths. We have then 
to take the chances of deriving an advantage two 
years hence; if we should then happen to have 
produce to sell, as a set-off to the large and heavy 
losses that are falling on us. 

But, in point of fact, it is the ability of Europe to 
purchase that determines the demand for and price 
of breadstuff's. I took occasion some years ago 
to examine the reports made by committees of the 
British Parliament in relation to the condition of 
the laboring population of England. It appeared 
that during periods of distress and famine the 
laboring classes were compelled to give up in suc- 
cession, as the pressure increased, such articles 
as were not indispensable; and that, for example, 
they first gave up sugar, then meat, after using it 
for a time only once a week, then bread, and finally 
they relied upon the potato alone. It appeared, 
from the investigation made at that time, that there 
was a disposition to consume a large amount of 
provisions if they had had the ability to obtain 
them. Necessity was the sole measure of their 
purchases. If the war goes on in Europe, with 
its heavy taxation diminishing the wealth and 
means of the people there, I doubt very much 
whether they will have the ability, to any great 
extent, to pay for our produce, even if we should 
have a large surplus. But even if it should prove 
otherwise, it is not probable that this additional 
demand will make up for the loss upon the other 
articles to which I have alluded. 

Again, specie is being rapidly drawn abroad from 



his country to satisfy the demands of the belliger- 
ents. There is, by consequence, an extraordinary 
pressure in the eastern cities, and extending itself 
nto the interior of the country, so as seriously to 
cripple all business transactions, and produce heavy 
losses to the community. Stocks of all kinds have 
also greatly fallen in value, to the detriment of 
many of the States, as well as of individuals. Be- 
sides all this, the shipping interest has suffered, 
and is suffering extremely. 

During the great wars in Napoleon's time, 
owing to the fact that Great Britain was excluded 
from most of the continental ports, our ships had 
the carrying trade. Such, however, is not now 
the case; but there are, in fact, nearly as many 
foreign ships engaged in trade as before the war 
began, owing to the fact that Russia has not the 
means of molesting the Allies on the sea. In fact, 
while the number of carriers remains about the 
same, the absolute value of freights is likely to be 
diminished, so that really the whole shipping 
interest is languishing, and the value of ships is 
twenty or thirty per cent, less than it was a few 
months ago. A gentleman behind me, from the 
maritime region, says that it has diminished fifty 
per cent. Doubtless he is right on this point. 

It is also probable, if the war continues for 
years, we shall suffer as purchasers. It is true 
that certain kinds of manufactures seem to have 
fallen in value. It must be remembered, however, 
that the present supply was created for a state of 
peace. One of the effects of a fall of prices is to 
diminish the amount produced. It will also fol- 
low, that if laborers are forced to serve in the 
armies — and on this account, and also by reason 
of exorbitant taxation, manufacturing establish- 
ments are broken up — there must be a correspond- 
ing rise in the value of articles produced. These 
are not new opinions with me; for in 1850, 1 con- 
tended, while discussing the tariff, that one of the 
reasons why manufactures were so cheap, was 
that a long peace in Europe had caused the wealth 
and labor, formerly expended in wars, to be em- 
ployed in production, and thus brought down the 
prices of articles, and put them in the reach of a 
larger number. If this was a sound argument, as 
I still think, then the reverse, viz: withdrawinglabor 
and capital from production, and expending it in 
war, will tend to raise prices in those commod- 
ities. 

I refer to all these matters to show that our 
interests are sufferimg from the effects of this war; 
how much it is not easy to determine. My own 
opinion is from fifty to a hundred millions of dol- 
lars a year. I have no doubt that it is largely 
more than the expenses of this Governments 
Now, if this be so, is it not worth while to see if 
any measures can be devised to remove the cause 
of such a loss ? 

But it may be said that this is only temporary, 
and that matters will soon get right. On the 
contrary, it strikes me that these evils must con- 
tinue and be permanent. England and France 
have already sent more than one hundred and 
fifty thousand men to the East. Now if they cost 
the Allies as much per man as our soldiers did 
in Mexico, it will be upwards of one thousand 
dollars per man for a campaign; and this, in the 
aggregate, amounts to one hundred and fifty mil- 
lions. Besides this, they have already made an 
enormous expenditure of .noney for the naval 



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armaments, both forthe Baltic and the Black seas. 
So that the whole expenditure may be nearly twice 
that sum. From the Eaglish papers, I observe 
that the British Government is about building a 
hundred and twenty steam gun boats, at a cost 
of $250,000 each. That item alone will amount to 
$30,000,000. The Russian and Turkish expendi- 
tures are also very large, so that the entire war 
expenses must reach several hundred millions. 

Now the money expended in this manner is as 
completely lost to the world as that invested in 
the Arctic when she went down into the waters 
of the deep sea. 

It is supposed that the Allies have lost forty or 
fifty thousand men, including those who have been 
slain in battle, died of disease, or have been per- 
manently disabled. The Russian loss is greater, 
especially if we take into account the campaign on 
the Danube. The same is probably true of the 
Turks. The loss of all must exceed one hundred 
thousand men. Now, North Carolina is an aver- 
age-sized State, in population, and she has only 
one hundred thousand voters. There has then 
been a number of men destroyed as great or greater 
than all the voting population of my State — men 
in the prime of life, men selected for their bodily 
vigor, and many of whom were men of intellect 
and education. All these are swept away. The 
effect of the war is far more disastrous than an 
epidemic disease which sweeps over a country, 
and takes away a like number of men, women, 
and children, indiscriminately. 

My object in making these remarks is to show 
that an immense amount of the wealth of the 
world, and a very large number of producers, as 
well as consumers of the products of our labors, are 
annihilated. I hold that such a loss is injurious to 
the commercial interests of every civilized country 
in the world, and especially to that of the United 
States. 

To prove the truth of this proposition, let us 
suppose the United States to be the only civilized 
country in the world, and all the rest to be filled 
with savages, we should have then no exports 
and no imports. This is evident as soon as stated. 
As in that contingency, all our surplus produc- 
tions would perish on our hands, I need not argue 
that this state of things would be immensely inju- 
rious to us. I maintain that, as you destroy the 
wealth of the civilized world to any great extent, 
you approximate that condition to which I have 
alluded. For instance, suppose that other nations 
were thrown back to the condition of things which 
existed twenty-five years ago. We then sold less 
than thirty millions of dollars worth of cotton. If 
Europe were in the same condition as at that time, 
and we had now a hundred millions to sell, but 
could find a market for only thirty millions, where 
should we find ourselves ? The extra amount of 
seventy millions would rot on our hands. But I 
take the further position, that even if this war, or 
any other cause, should keep the rest of the world 
stationary for the next ten years, we should be 
greatly losers, because we are constantly increas- 
ing our productions; and hence, if there should 
not be a proportionate increase in the markets of 
the world, we should be losers. 

I think, therefore, that the proposition can be 
maintained as a sound one in political economy, 
that you cannot destroy a large amount of the 
wealth of the world, without injury to us as a 



great commercial nation. There may be excep- 
tions to this rule here and there, but as a general 
proposition, it holds good. If, then, the war be 
injurious to us, financially and commercially, will 
it benefit us politically ? In reference to the ques- 
tion of the balance of power in Europe, it is true 
that it is not a matter for us to interfere with. But 
I may say that you could not change that balance 
of power without prejudicing us. For example, 
if Russia becomes omnipotent, and crushes the 
western commercial nations, though the Czar 
might himself be as just and as moderate as our 
own Washington, his successors might not be 
so, and it is easy to see that their conduct could 
change things to our injury. If the Allies, on the 
other hand, should prove decidedly victorious, 
their ascendancy might give them, not only greater 
power, but also greater inclination to interfere with 
us on this side of the globe. Looking, therefore, 
to the mere question of the balance of power in 
Europe, you cannot change it without putting us 
in a worse condition than we now are. I hope it 
will remain evenly balanced, so that each Power 
may be able to hold others in check, and prevent 
mischief. 

But having barely adverted to these topics to 
show that this war is an evil to us, I pass now to 
the consideration of the other great question. Is 
there anything in the attendant circumstances of 
a character to induce a belief that our country 
might exert an influence to bring the war to a 
close? This, Mr. Chairman, is a question of great 
delicacy, as it involves an examination of the 
grounds of the war itself. If I were to enter into 
a discussion of its causes, 1 should speak of things 
which persons in Europe, perhaps, understand 
better than I can do here. In the next place, I might 
get up such a debate as would lead to a discussion 
of the merits of the several contending parties, and 
put ourselves in a position which neutrals ought 
not to occupy. I therefore feel the full force of 
the caution given by the old Roman poet, to those 
who tread on ashes that may conceal fires under- 
neath. Nevertheless, I desire to make a sugges- 
tion or two on this point. 

The war originally rested upon a very narrow 
basis, so small that the parties themselves did not 
expect it to produce a war. This is clear from 
their procrastination and tardiness in making ade- 
quate preparations for so great a contest. In fact, 
it was supposed, at one time, that they had settled 
the difficulty. The Czar himself is represented to 
have said that the war is one " for which, judged 
by its apparent grounds, there is no reason; and 
it is contrary to the moral, industrial, and com- 
mercial interests of the entire world." It is true, 
that he goes on to charge that the purpose rvf 4fes 
Allies is to limit the power of Russia. Well, if 
that be their purpose, of course any offer of medi- 
ation from us would most probably lead to no 
favorable result. But I do not understand that 
the Allies have planted themselves upon that 
ground as yet. And even if they have for a mo- 
ment entertained such notions, the formidable 
resistance they have met with when attacking 
what was supposed to be the exposed point of the 
Czar's dominions, will go far to satisfy them that 
it is not an easy matter so to change the map of 
Europe as to deprive Russia of any portion of her 
territory. I do n ot believe they will persist in any 
such purpose. They are governed by wise and 



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sagacious statesmen; and, in view of the difficul- 
ties which present themselves, I do not think they 
entertain the idea that, without a longer struggle 
than either of these Governments are willing to 
make, they can materially diminish the power of 
Russia. 

All history shows that the apparent strength of 
alliances is deceptive. Where all the parties are 
acting in good faith, and with equal zeal, it very 
frequently happens that, from the want of proper 
concert of action, they fail to accomplish their 
object. All Europe at one time assailed France 
unsuccessfully, and Napoleon, himself, at a later 
day, carried most of the European nations with 
him against Russia, but his reverses caused Aus- 
tria and other Powers to secede and join his 
enemies, so that he was in the end overwhelmed. 
I take it for granted, therefore, that these sagacious 
statesmen will not rely so fully on this alliance, 
powerful as it seems to be, as to press the matter 
to the extreme I have alluded to. 

It does not strike me, Mr. Chairman, that it is 
the interest of either of these Powers to desire a 
prolongation of the war. England is a commer- 
cial nation. The English people are brave, and 
energetic, and patient, and so long as their Gov- 
ernment tells them it is necessary to carry on the 
war they will submit to sacrifices. But England 
can have no hope of acquiring territory, so as to 
compensate her for these sacrifices. This remark 
applies equally to France. Her Emperor seems 
to have been directing his energies of late very 
much to the improvement of the interior of his 
own country, in all respects, and to the beautifying 
of Paris, its magnificent capital. I do not, there- 
fore, believe that the Allies will at present desire to 
prolong the war. And very clearly it cannot be the 
interest of Russia to have war rather than peace. 
The Emperor of Russia has a territory twice as 
large as that of the United States. It is but 
thinly settled, and the facilities of communication 
between the different parts of it are not such as they 
should be. He marches men a thousand miles 
from Moscow to the Black Sea or the Danube, 
and they are decimated two or three times over 
by disease and fatigue, ere they reach the point 
of action. Now, you and I know very well, sir, 
that railroads from Moscow and St. Petersburgh 
to the Danube, the Crimea, and the Caspian , would 
make Russia stronger now than she would be with 
the whole Turkish empire annexed, without these 
facilities. I take it for granted that a sagacious 
ruler, like the Czar, would rather improve the 
condition of his country, in this respect, than 
prolong such a war. Great Britain is just the 
reverse of Russia in this respect; and by reason 
^ef .her compactness, insular position, and mari- 
time supremacy, she is a formidable antagonist to 
any country under the sun, having one league of 
sea coast. 

But, Mr. Chairman, I have no doubt that there 
were some mistakes made originally. I think it 
highly probable that the parties took the succes- 
sive steps that led them into this war without fore- 
seeing where they would carry them. The Em- 
peror of Russia may not have expected such an 
alliance when he took possession of the Principal- 
ities, and the Allies probably thought he would 
recede when they made their demonstration. But, 
sir, they have now placed themselves in a position 
where neither can well make the first move to- 



wards a settlement, without a sacrifice of pride, 
and perhaps of prestige. Their condition is well 
described by Vattel, in a few sentences, which I 
will read to the committee. He says: 

" Two nations, though equally weary of war, often con- 
tinue it merely from the fear of making the first advances 
to an accommodation, as these, might be imputed to weak- 
ness; or ihey persist in it from animosity, and against their 
own interests. Then common friends effectually interpose, 
offering themselves as mediators. And there cannot be a 
more beneficent office than that of reconciling two nations 
at war, and thus putting a stop to the effusion of blood. 
This is an indispensable duty to those who are possessed 
of the means of suceeding in it." 

These sentences, Mr. Chairman, express fully 
what I would say on this point. But if the con- 
test be not terminated now, it must soon become 
a general European war. It will next year prob- 
ably get into Germany and Italy, and be more 
destructive than the wars of Napoleon, because 
the means of aggression and destruction are greater 
at this time than they were in his day. When 
the tri-colbred flag is on the Danube, or the Vis- 
tula, the impetuous glory-loving Frenchman will 
have brought back vividly the recollections of 
Marengo, and Jena, and Austerlitz, and Wagram. 
All Europe will be in a blaze, and the war will 
fall with destructive and crushing force on the 
industrial and lower classes, who, in such times, 
are always the greatest sufferers. 

There are some who look with hope and pleas- 
ure to this condition of things. They say that 
the Governments will be overthrown , and the cause 
of liberty advanced. I have no doubt but that 
some of the existing Governments will be put 
down, but I do not concur in the opinion that 
republicanism will gain. You may see one 
tyrannical Government overthrown, and another, 
stronger and more tyrannical, erected in its stead. 
The only liberty which is worth preserving, is 
that which is founded upon law. And from the 
days of Julius Caesar down to the present time, 
"arms and laws have not flourished together." 
On the contrary, during military struggles, des- 
potism raises its head and dominates over the land 
amidst the clangor of arms. To protect life and 
property, power must be given to the existing 
Governments. The greater the perils which sur- 
round them, the higher the powers with which 
they must be invested. Men will submit to any 
exactions, therefore, to support vast military 
armaments. But let there he peace and security, 
and these very armaments, being no longer neces- 
sary to the safety of the State, soon become 
intolerable and will be discarded. 

Sir, the history of modern Europe sustains this 
position. It was after a period of peace that the 
first French revolution exhibited itself, and at the 
close of the long and desolating wars to which it 
gave rise — I mean when the Congress of Vienna 
sat — liberty lay low all over Europe. It was after 
a long period of peace that the revolution of 1830 
shook down the French monarchy, and extended 
its vibrations into distant Poland. It was after 
another long period of peace that the revolution 
of 1848 blazed out in France, illuminating Lom- 
bardy, Italy, and Hungary, until its light was 
dimmed and extinguished by the smoke of battle. 

Sir, our neighbor, Mexico, has had war enough 
in the last fifty years to have made her people 
the freest on earth, and yet, though many tyran- 
nical Governments have been put down there, 



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the cause of civil liberty has not advanced. Nor 
has it in the South American States; nor in the 
world generally, during hostile struggles. What 
I mean to say is, not that war may not be some- 
times necessary to protect liberty, but I affirm that 
liberty does not usually spring out of war; that 
where you have one case of that kind, I can point 
to a hundred of a contrary tendency. Looking, 
therefore, simply to the interest, of the masses of 
Europe, I would rather have peace than war. In 
peace you have the railroad and telegraph and the 
newspaper. Every newspaper, and letter, and 
message is an atom thrown on the side of liberty. 
You will find that as men become wealthier they 
will become more intelligent and more tenacious of 
their political and personal rights. 

These views, Mr. Chairman, accord with our 
own political system. We have the smallest army 
and navy of any of the great nations, and our 
policy has been that of peace, in the main, from 
the days of Washington. There are, too, pas- 
sages in our own history, which render it imper- 
t ative that we should make the movement which I 
have indicated. It is well known that during our 
revolutionary struggle, Prance interfered on our 
side, and ultimately became our ally, and aided us 
until the end of the struggle. But for that inter- 
vention it is highly probable that the assembly 
which I am addressing to-day would not exist. 
And, sir, while alluding to this, I find myself un- 
expectedly in the presence of one who calls up 
recollections; I cannot see, at this moment, without 
emotions, the gentleman on my left. [Mr. Cling- 
man looked atM. Lafayette, who was sitting near 
him] 

A Voice. "Who is it?" 

It isj (said Mr. Clingman, continuing,) he 
whose grandsire is pictured on that tapestry, 
(pointing to the full length portrait of the Marquis 
de Lafayette, on the left of the Speaker.) When 
we remember the past, made vivid by the sight of 
that picture and this living representative, is there 
one who can doubt but that we owe a deep debt of 
gratitude to France. While I would not pretend 
that we ought, under the circumstances, to take 
part, by force, on her side, I nevertheless maintain 
that we are under the highest obligations to do 
everything consistently with our own interest, to 
relieve Prance from danger or difficulty. 

At a later period in our history, when we were 
at war with England, in 1812, Russia tendered 
her mediation. That mediation was, in the lan- 
guage of Mr. Monroe, the Secretary of State, 
" willingly accepted" by our Government. Great 
Britain declined it, but subsequently, and after she 
q* had triumphed over her great adversary in Europe, 
and was prepared to turn all her forces against 
the United States, and thus give the war a much 
more serious and formidable^haracter, it is well 
known that the interference of Alexander of 
Russia contributed , in a powerful manner, towards 
the pacification which took place. Russia, too, 
it appears, then, has strong claims to any good 
offices we can render her. 

Still later in our progress as a nation there is 
an incident, and a precedent more striking and 
conclusive in its character. In 1835, when this 
Government, under the administration of General 
Jackson was in imminent danger of being involved 
in war with Prance, Great Britain tendered her 
mediation. It was accepted, both by us and by 



the King of France, and a pacification between 
the two Governments was the result. Upon this 
point I cannot do better than to read a few sen- 
tences from the work of the distinguished gentle- 
man from Missouri, [Mr. Benton.] After allud- 
ing to the state of things which then existed — the 
exhaustion of negotiations and the preparatory 
armaments on both sides, he refers to the fact that 
General Jackson sent in a message to Congress, 
announcing his acceptance of the mediation, and 
uses the following language: 

" In communicating the offer of the British mediation the 
President expressed his high appreciation of the ' elevated 
and die-interested motives of that offer.' The motives 
were, in fact, both elevated and disinterested ; and presents 
one of those noble spectacles in the conduct of nations on 
which history loves to dwell. France and the United States 
had fought together against Great Britain ; now Great Britain 
steps between France and the United States to prevent them 
from fighting each other. George the Third received the 
combined attacks of French and Americans; his son, Wil- 
liam the Fourth, interposes to prevent their arms from being 
turned against each other. It was a noble intervention, and 
a just return for the good work of the Emperor Alexander 
in offering his mediation between the United States and 
Great Britain — good works these peace mediations, and as 
nearly divineas humanity can reach ; — worthy of all praises 
of long rememberance, and continual imitation ; — the more 
so in this case of the British mediation when the event to 
be prevented would have been so favorable to British inter- 
ests—would have thrown the commerce of the United 
States and of France into her hands, and enriched her at 
the expense of both. Happily the progress of the age which, 
in cultivating good will among nations, elevates great 
Powers above all selfishness, and permits no unfriendly 
recollection — no selfish calculation— to balk the impulsions 
of a noble philanthropy. 

These, Mr. Chairman, are just and noble senti- 
ments in themselves, and concisely and hand- 
somely expressed. Andrew Jackson, then at the 
head of our Government, was not a man likely to 
succumb to an adversary, or to admit improper 
interference from a foreign quarter. Nor did any 
man in these Halls, or in the country, censure 
his acceptance of the mediation. Every one knew 
that that iron will, before which the veteran col- 
umns of England were broken to pieces at New 
Orleans, would have been not less strikingly ex- 
hibited in defense of any right that could claim 
the protection of our flag. 

It thus appears that each one of these three great 
Powers has, in periods of trial or danger to us, 
interfered for our relief; and shall we not recipro- 
cate their good offices ? Shall we be always readv 
to receive benefits, and never to return them ? Shall 
we fold our arms, and coolly look on, while our 
former friends are struggling in the midst of perils? 
Above all, shall we refuse to act because we hope 
to take benefits from their misfortunes ? Is a great 
Government like ours to occupy the position of 
the wrecker, who stands upon the sea-beach during 
the storm, praying that navies may be strained, 
that he may seize upon the floating fragments^ 
Shall we imitate the kite and the vulture that fol; 
low armies to prey upon the slain, or the sharks 
that collect around the sinking ship to devour the 
drowning inmates? If any gentleman here haa 
such feelings, I envy him not their enjoyment. 

If we were, as a nation, too feeble to protect 
ourselves, we might, upon the plea of necessity, 
justify being thus contemptible. We might then 
have an excuse for wishing that others might be 
crippled lest they should hurt us. But while in 
a war with any great maritime Power our com- 
merce would seriously suffer, there is no nation in 
less danger of conquest or mutilation. We can, 



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therefore, afford to be just and honorable, yea, even 
magnanimous. 

There is another reason, Mr. Chairman, which 
operates with great force on my mind as an argu- 
ment for my proposition. The impression pre- 
vails in Europe, or, at all events, has been sought 
to be created there, that we are a grasping and a 
rapacious people. I do not, for a moment, admit 
the justice of this charge against us. On the con- 
trary, I think the United States have shown, from 
their earliest history, a commendable moderation. 
I recollect very well being told by a gentleman 
who had just returned from Europe, whilst the 
Texas annexation was pending, that the veteran 
statesman Metternich said to him, there was not 
a Government in Europe that would have hesi- 
tated a moment to take Texas on the terms on 
which she offered herself. In fact, while England 
has been taking kingdom after kingdom in Asia, 
and France has been extending her conquests over 
Africa, and the other European Governments have 
been taking all the territory they could acquire 
without peril to themselves, we may well chal- 
lenge a comparison with thein. 

I may say, further, in order that no gentle- 
man may misunderstand the feelings with which 
I make these remarks, that I belong to what is 
called the party of progress, or to Young America. 
I am in favor of the acquisition of territory under 
proper circumstances. Nevertheless, while I en- 
tertain these opinions, and believe that injustice 
has been done to our country abroad, it is im- 
possible to conceal the fact that the impression 
prevails in Europe that we desire this war to 
continue, in order that we may get an opportunity 
to seize upon our neighbor's territory. Now, by 
making this movement we shall truthfully, and at 
the same time, gracefully remove any such im- 
pression. Besides, sir, it would be a declaration 
of neutrality in the most emphatic form . It would 
not only be a declaration that our Government 
intended to stand neutral, but that it did not de3ire 
that the war should continue to the injury of the 
parties themselves. If the movement were to be 
successful — if we were to be instrumental in 
relieving these belligerents from their present diffi- 
culties, it would give us the greatest consideration, 
not only with the Governments, but also with the 
masses of the people. 

I maintain that if our country and its Govern- 
ment becomes popular with the people of Great 
Britain and France, and with the other nations 
of Europe, the monarchs would not like to quarrel 
with us in opposition to the wishes of their sub- 
jects. But where there is ill-feeling between coun- 
tries, a single spark will sometimes light the flames 
of war, 



I have, Mr. Chairman, discussed this question 
mainly upon the narrow ground of our interests 
as a nation. This, however, is not the mode to 
do full justice to the subject. To do this will re- 
quire a much wider range of thought and inves- 
tigation. Independently of all calculations of 
interest, considerations of humanity rise up and 
force themselves upon the mind. The earth waB 
given to man for his dominion and control. But 
it is only in our times that men are beginning to 
assert that right in its full extent. I do not mean 
to say that in former ages men have not been 
spread over the earth, but it is only in our day that 
they have begun to turn its great natural agents 
to account. This war will stop the progress of 
humanity. It will destroy the greatest and beat 
works of man, and throw him back upon the bar- 
barism of the past. 

Besides, it is a war between th e differentbranches 
of the great Caucasian family — the white races of 
men, who have shown by their superior mental 
and moral endowments, their right to control the 
world and regulate its destinies. It is also a 
war, in the main, between Christian nations; and 
we are impelled, therefore, by considerations of 
humanity, of race, and of religion, to interpose, 
if our interposition can avail anything. If the 
movement is to be made, it should begin here. 
We represent the feelings, the very heart of the 
American people; hence our sanction will give 
greater force and consideration to the movement. 
But to the Executive, who has the charge of 
conducting the foreign affairs of the country, it 
belongs properly to decide when and how the 
step should be taken. If there be not a fitting 
occasion just now, it may be otherwise a few 
months hence. 

Entertaining these feelings, my original object 
was to bring the subject before the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, and let that committee determine 
whether such a movement was advisable; if it 
were, to let it begin with Congress, but leave to 
the Executive the mode and manner of conducting 
it. The President, of course, has an acquaintance 
with the condition of things which nobody else 
can possess, and to him, therefore, would I leave 
it to determine whether the movement should be 
made now or at some future day, and whether the 
offer of mediation should be tendered through the 
foreign ministers here or through our ministers 
abroad, or in any other mode that he might regard 
as best calculated to effect the object. Whenever 
he should think proper to act, he would then move 
in the matter with all the authority of the Gov- 
ernment to sustain him.. If the movement shall 
be made, I have no doubt but that it would be 
sanctioned and approved by our constituents. 



Printed at tbe Congressional Globe Office. 



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